Person

Ivan Vladimirovich Osipov

Sanctioned entity

Born 21 Aug 1976 (50 years old),Russia. Named in 16 sanctions listings.

Screen this subject

Summary

The Director Disqualification Sanction was imposed on 09/04/2025.

(also Ivan Vasilyevich SPIRIDONOV, Ivan SPIRIDONOV, Ivan OSIPOV)

(Date of UN designation: 2022-11-14)

(UE) 2022/2228 du 14/11/2022 (UE Lutte contre la prolifération des armes chimiques - R (UE) 2018/1542) (FondementJuridique: 2473)

(also Ivan Vladimirovich OSIPOV)

A member of Alexei Navalny's poisoning group.

Ivan Osipov est un agent du Service fédéral de sécurité russe (FSB) travaillant en tant qu’agent de l’Institut de criminalistique. À ce titre, il a directement participé aux préparatifs et à l’exécution de l’empoisonnement d’Alexeï Navalny au moyen d’un agent neurotoxique de type Novitchok à Tomsk le 20 août 2020, empoisonnement qui constitue une utilisation d’armes chimiques au sens de la convention sur les armes chimiques. Par conséquent, Ivan Osipov était impliqué dans les préparatifs en vue d’utiliser des armes chimiques ainsi que dans l’emploi d’armes chimiques.

Sanctions and listings16

  • Listed
    20 Aug 2021

    Non-Proliferation Sanctions - NPWMD

    Office of Foreign Assets ControlUS OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) ListUnited States

    MAGNIT, NPWMD and block

    Executive Order 13382 (Non-proliferation)

    Magnitsky

    Programme US-NON-PROLIFReference 32814treasury.govofac.treasury.gov

  • Serious Violations Or Serious Abuses Of Human Rights Sanctions Regime - Autonomous (Thematic - Human Rights)

    Department of Foreign Affairs and TradeAustralian Sanctions Consolidated ListAustralia

    Targeted financial sanction and travel ban

    Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons—Thematic Sanctions) Amendment (No. 1) Instrument 2022

    Programme AU-HUMANLast updated 10 Dec 2022dfat.gov.audfat.gov.au

  • Listed
    10 Nov 2022

    Special Economic Measures Act - Russia

    Global Affairs CanadaCanadian Consolidated Autonomous Sanctions List on the Russian invasion of UkraineCanada

    The following individuals are members of the Russian justice and security sectors, including police officers and investigators, prosecutors, judges, and prison officials, involved in gross and systematic human rights violations against Russian opposition leaders.

    Programme CA-SEMAinternational.gc.cainternational.gc.ca

  • Effective
    20 Aug 2021

    UK sanctions relating to chemical weapons - The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

    UK; Foreign, Commonwealth & Development OfficeUK FCDO Sanctions ListUnited Kingdom

    Asset freeze, travel ban and director disqualification sanction

    Ivan Osipov is an FSB operative in the Criminalistics Institute - Military Unit 34435. Evidence including phone and travel records suggest that Ivan Osipov was one of the operatives involved in the use of a chemical weapon in the attempted assassination of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny during his August 2020 visit to Siberia. A chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. Osipov was an operative of the Criminalistics Unit present in Tomsk where Navalny was poisoned. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that Ivan Osipov, in his capacity as an operative in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, was present in Tomsk at the time of the poisoning and was one of the key operatives responsible for the preparation and use of a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny.

    Ivan Osipov is an FSB operative in the Criminalistics Institute - Military Unit 34435. Evidence including phone and travel records suggest that Ivan Osipov was one of the operatives involved in the use of a chemical weapon in the attempted assassination of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny during his August 2020 visit to Siberia. A chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. Osipov was an operative of the Criminalistics Unit present in Tomsk where Navalny was poisoned. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that Ivan Osipov, in his capacity as an operative in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, was present in Tomsk at the time of the poisoning and was one of the key operatives responsible for the preparation and use of a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny.

    Programme GB-CWReference CHW0020Reference 14134Last updated 9 Apr 2025gov.ukgov.uk

  • Listed
    14 Sep 2021
    Effective
    20 Aug 2021

    Reciprocal

    OFACUS SAM Procurement ExclusionsUnited StatesActive

    Prohibition/Restriction

    Redacted for Security Reasons

    sam.gov

  • Official designation

    La Principauté de MonacoMonaco National Fund Freezing ListMonaco

    (UE) 2022/2228 du 14/11/2022

    Autorité de désignation publiée : Union européenne

    Ivan Osipov est un agent du Service fédéral de sécurité russe (FSB) travaillant en tant qu’agent de l’Institut de criminalistique. À ce titre, il a directement participé aux préparatifs et à l’exécution de l’empoisonnement d’Alexeï Navalny au moyen d’un agent neurotoxique de type Novitchok à Tomsk le 20 août 2020, empoisonnement qui constitue une utilisation d’armes chimiques au sens de la convention sur les armes chimiques. Par conséquent, Ivan Osipov était impliqué dans les préparatifs en vue d’utiliser des armes chimiques ainsi que dans l’emploi d’armes chimiques.

    geldefonds.gouv.mc

  • Listed
    14 Sep 2021
    Effective
    20 Aug 2021

    Reciprocal

    OFACUS SAM Procurement ExclusionsUnited StatesActive

    Prohibition/Restriction

    Redacted for Security Reasons

    sam.gov

  • Listed
    14 Nov 2022

    EU Restrictive Measures Against The Proliferation And Use Of Chemical Weapons

    Federal Public Service FinanceBelgian Financial SanctionsBelgium

    2022/2228 (OJ L293-I)

    Programme EU-CHEMfinance.belgium.besanctionsmap.eu

  • Listed
    14 Nov 2022

    EU Restrictive Measures Against The Proliferation And Use Of Chemical Weapons - CHEM

    Directorate‑General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets UnionEU Financial Sanctions Files (FSF)European Union

    Designation date published: 2022-11-14

    regulationType=amendment; organisationType=council

    2022/2228 (OJ L293-I)

    Programme EU-CHEMReference EU.9016.38eur-lex.europa.eusanctionsmap.eu

  • Effective
    5 Oct 2021

    Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions" No. 1644-VII dated 14 Aug. 2014 - 497/2021

    National Security and Defense CouncilUkraine NSDC State Register of SanctionsUkraine

    [2] обмеження торговельних операцій(повне припинення торговельних операцій), [24] позбавлення державних нагород україни, інших форм відзначення, [4] запобігання виведенню капіталів за межі україни, [7] заборона участі у приватизації, оренді державного майна резидентами іноземної держави та особами, які прямо чи опосередковано контролюються резидентами іноземної держави або діють в їх інтересах, [19] заборона передання технологій, прав на об’єкти права інтелектуальної власності, [14] припинення видачі дозволів, ліцензій на ввезення в україну з іноземної держави чи вивезення з україни валютних цінностей та обмеження видачі готівки за платіжними картками, емітованими резидентами іноземної держави, [6] припинення дії або зупинення ліцензій та інших дозволів, одержання (наявність) яких є умовою для здійснення певного виду діяльності, зокрема, припинення дії чи зупинення дії спеціальних дозволів на користування надрами, [11] заборона або обмеження заходження іноземних невійськових суден та військових кораблів до територіального моря україни, її внутрішніх вод, портів та повітряних суден до повітряного простору україни або здійснення посадки на території україни, [1] блокування активів - тимчасове обмеження права особи користуватися та розпоряджатися належним їй майном, [5] зупинення виконання економічних та фінансових зобов’язань, [25] інші санкції, що відповідають принципам їх застосування, встановленим цим законом, [13] заборона видачі дозволів, ліцензій національного банку україни на здійснення інвестицій в іноземну державу, розміщення валютних цінностей на рахунках і вкладах на території іноземної держави and [3] обмеження, часткове чи повне припинення транзиту ресурсів, польотів та перевезень територією україни(повне припинення транзиту ресурсів та перевезень територією україни)

    Programme UA-SA1644Reference 21049711100090drs.nsdc.gov.uapresident.gov.ua

  • Actions Taken Pursuant to Section 7031(c)(1) for Involvement in a Gross Violation of Human Rights :

    US State DepartmentUS Anti-Kleptocracy and Human Rights Visa RestrictionsUnited States

    (1)(C) Public Designation.

    state.govstate.gov

  • Listed
    14 Sep 2021
    Effective
    20 Aug 2021

    Reciprocal

    OFACUS SAM Procurement ExclusionsUnited StatesActive

    Prohibition/Restriction

    Redacted for Security Reasons

    sam.gov

  • Listed
    10 Nov 2022

    Special Economic Measures Act - Russia

    Global Affairs CanadaCanadian Consolidated Autonomous Sanctions ListCanada

    1, Part 1.1

    Programme CA-SEMAReference 29international.gc.cainternational.gc.ca

  • EU Restrictive Measures Against The Proliferation And Use Of Chemical Weapons - (UE) 2022/2228 du 14/11/2022 (UE Lutte contre la prolifération des armes chimiques - R (UE) 2018/1542)

    Direction Générale du TrésorFrench National Asset Freezing SystemFrance

    Ivan Osipov est un agent du Service fédéral de sécurité russe (FSB) travaillant en tant qu’agent de l’Institut de criminalistique. À ce titre, il a directement participé aux préparatifs et à l’exécution de l’empoisonnement d’Alexeï Navalny au moyen d’un agent neurotoxique de type Novitchok à Tomsk le 20 août 2020, empoisonnement qui constitue une utilisation d’armes chimiques au sens de la convention sur les armes chimiques. Par conséquent, Ivan Osipov était impliqué dans les préparatifs en vue d’utiliser des armes chimiques ainsi que dans l’emploi d’armes chimiques.

    Programme EU-CHEMgels-avoirs.dgtresor.gouv.frsanctionsmap.eu

  • EU Restrictive Measures Against The Proliferation And Use Of Chemical Weapons - Council Decision concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons

    Council of the European UnionEU Consolidated Travel BansEuropean Union

    regulationType=council decision; organisationType=council

    Council Decision concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons

    Programme EU-CHEMeur-lex.europa.eusanctionsmap.eu

  • Listed
    14 Sep 2021
    Effective
    20 Aug 2021

    Reciprocal

    OFACUS SAM Procurement ExclusionsUnited StatesActive

    Prohibition/Restriction

    Redacted for Security Reasons

    sam.gov

Positions held5

  1. Period not retained

    Agent du Service fédéral de sécurité russe (FSB)

  2. Period not retained

    оперативний співробітник інституту криміналістки ФСБ РФ (в/ч 34435)

  3. Period not retained

    FSB Operative attached to Criminalistics Institute

  4. Period not retained

    agent of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) working as a Criminalistics Institute operative

  5. Period not retained

    Agent du Service fédéral de sécurité russe.

Connections1

Other links1

Other names25

Also known as24

Osipov Ivan VolodymyrovychИван ОСИПОВIvan Vasilyevich SpiridonovIvan SpiridinovИван Владимирович ОсиповIvan Vasiljevitj SPIRIDONOVOSIPOV, IvanОсипов Иван ВладимировичIvan Vladimirovitj OSIPOVИван СпиридоновIvan SpiridonovSPIRIDONOV, IvanIvan OsipovIvan SPIRIDINOVSPIRIDONOV, Ivan VasilyevichIvan Vasilyevich SPIRIDONOVIvan OSIPOVOsipov Ivan
Show 6 more
OSIPOV, Ivan VladimirovichOsipov Ivan VladimirovichИван Васильевич СПИРИДОНОВОсіпов Іван ВолодимировичIvan SPIRIDONOVIvan Vladimirovich OSIPOV

Weak aliases1

Spellings the source flags as too generic to establish a match on their own.

Ivan Vasiljevitc SPIRIDONOV

Addresses2

  • Moscow Russia

  • Moscow

This page shows the public record as its publishers state it. A name here is not by itself a finding: whether a record refers to a particular person or company is what screening decides. Read the full notice.